Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Lucamarini, M
• Yuan, Z L
• Dynes, J F
• Shields, A J

Titel

Overcoming the rate-distance limit of quantum key distribution without quantum repeaters

Ist Teil von

• Nature (London), 2018-05, Vol.557 (7705), p.400-403

Ort / Verlag

England: Nature Publishing Group

Erscheinungsjahr

2018

Link zum Volltext

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties to share encryption keys with security based on physical laws. Experimentally, QKD has been implemented via optical means, achieving key rates of 1.26 megabits per second over 50 kilometres of standard optical fibre and of 1.16 bits per hour over 404 kilometres of ultralow-loss fibre in a measurement-device-independent configuration . Increasing the bit rate and range of QKD is a formidable, but important, challenge. A related target, which is currently considered to be unfeasible without quantum repeaters , is overcoming the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD . This limit defines the maximum possible secret key rate that two parties can distil at a given distance using QKD and is quantified by the secret-key capacity of the quantum channel that connects the parties. Here we introduce an alternative scheme for QKD whereby pairs of phase-randomized optical fields are first generated at two distant locations and then combined at a central measuring station. Fields imparted with the same random phase are 'twins' and can be used to distil a quantum key. The key rate of this twin-field QKD exhibits the same dependence on distance as does a quantum repeater, scaling with the square-root of the channel transmittance, irrespective of who (malicious or otherwise) is in control of the measuring station. However, unlike schemes that involve quantum repeaters, ours is feasible with current technology and presents manageable levels of noise even on 550 kilometres of standard optical fibre. This scheme is a promising step towards overcoming the rate-distance limit of QKD and greatly extending the range of secure quantum communications.