Managerial and decision economics, 2014-07, Vol.35 (5), p.350-356
2014
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Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment
- Ist Teil von
- Managerial and decision economics, 2014-07, Vol.35 (5), p.350-356
- Ort / Verlag
- Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2014
- Quelle
- Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- This paper analyzes a model in which owners of competing firms can hire biased managers for strategic reasons. We show that independent of the mode of competition, that is, price or quantities, owners hire aggressive managers. This result contrasts with the classic literature on strategic delegation.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0143-6570eISSN: 1099-1468DOI: 10.1002/mde.2619Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1544965849
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Bias, Commitments, Competition, Competitive firms, Managers, Strategic planning, Studies