Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• ORENES, ISABEL
• JOHNSON-LAIRD, P. N.

Titel

Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences

Ist Teil von

• Mind & language, 2012-09, Vol.27 (4), p.357-377

Ort / Verlag

Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Erscheinungsjahr

2012

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a game then she didn't play soccer. Two experiments corroborated this prediction for three sorts of ‘paradox’, including a disjunctive paradox.