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Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2018-09, Vol.66 (4), p.488-506
Ort / Verlag
De Gruyter
Erscheinungsjahr
2018
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
Alma/SFX Local Collection
Beschreibungen/Notizen
This paper presents and discusses Karl Löwith’s anthropological critique of existential analytic that is formulated in his Habilitation thesis (
, 1928), where he develops an anthropological counter-paradigm, i. e.
, in opposition to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Given the extent and the complexity of such a subject, I will limit the present inquiry to two specific topics: the
(Being-with-one-another) and above all the
(Being-towards-death). In practice, I will first explain the basic features of Mitanthropologie together with the crucial critique that it levels at
. I will follow by outlining the importance of the
(the question of death) within the existential analytic by means of a comparison between Heidegger’s
and Kierkegaard’s
(
). Finally, I will expound Löwith’s objection to
, which is expressed in the alternative formula
(Freedom-towards-death).