Sie befinden Sich nicht im Netzwerk der Universität Paderborn. Der Zugriff auf elektronische Ressourcen ist gegebenenfalls nur via VPN oder Shibboleth (DFN-AAI) möglich.
mehr Informationen...
The various paradoxes of soc choice uncovered by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen & others have led some writers to question the basic assumption of a binary soc choice function underlying most of these paradoxes. T. Schwartz (see SA 19:5/71F0336), for example, proves an important theorem which may be considered to be a generalization of the famous paradox of Arrow, & then lays the blame for this paradox on the assumption of a binary soc choice function. He then proceeds to define a type of choice functions which, like binary choice functions, defines the best elements in sets of more than 2 alternatives on the basis of binary comparisons, but which, as he claims, has an advantage over binary choice functions, in so far as it always ensures the existence of best elements for sets of more than 2 alternatives irrespective of the results of binary comparisons. An attempt is made to show that even a considerable weakening of the assumption of a binary soc choice function does not go very far towards solving some of the paradoxes under consideration, & that if replacing the requirement of a binary soc choice function by a Schwartz type soc function solves these paradoxes, it does so only by violating the universally acceptable value judgment that in choosing from a set of alternatives, society should never choose an alternative which is Pareto inoptimal in that set (ie, the soc'ly best alternatives in a set should always be Pareto optimal). This argument is substantiated with the help of an extended version of Sen's paradox of a Paretian liberal & thus a by-product of the analysis is a generalization of the theorem of Sen. The argument itself, however, is more general & applies also to the impossibility result proved by Schwartz. HA.