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This paper explores the process and outcome of Afghanistan's 2014 presidential election from a limited access social order perspective, building on the influential work of Douglass North and colleagues on violence and social orders. Under the threat of postelection violence, nontransparent, internationally overseen bargaining led to a negotiated result that accommodated the runner-up in the initial vote count by creating a new high-level government position and giving him a share in ministerial nominations. Applying the North et al. framework and related analysis, the paper discusses the contradictions, clashes, and perverse effects that can arise when democratic institutional forms such as elections are imposed on a limited access order, especially a fragile one like Afghanistan. It argues for modest expectations and longer time horizons, focusing less on each individual election and more on developing effective political institutions (including not least robust political parties), avoiding international interventions that inadvertently worsen outcomes or create problems for the future, and not combining elections with other major 'turning points' such as withdrawal of foreign troops or sharp reductions in aid and international political support.