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To date, theoretical models of lobbying have assumed a simple transaction between policymakers and lobbyists and have not yet explained why lobbying is largely conducted through repeated interactions between policymakers and lobbyists, why the lobbying industry is so focused on building relationships, and what value is added by lobbying intermediaries. Given the exponential growth in lobbying firms, which rely heavily on relationships, understanding the particularities of the relationship market has become increasingly important. Before introducing and modeling the theory of the "relationship market," the authors briefly describe traditional notions from the literature that characterize lobbying as a single transaction of exchange, information, or subsidy. They then describe recent empirical work documenting the rise of lobbying intermediaries and the increasing emphasis on relationships within the lobbying industry. Finally, they introduce the "relationship market," a theory that incorporates the incentives of policymakers, lobbyists, and citizens as repeat players.