Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Okasha, Samir

Titel

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF DECISION THEORY

Ist Teil von

• Economics and philosophy, 2016-11, Vol.32 (3), p.409-433

Ort / Verlag

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Erscheinungsjahr

2016

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• This paper explores the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic interpretations of decision theory. The former regards credences and utilities as psychologically real, while the latter regards them as mere representations of an agent's preferences. Philosophers typically adopt the former interpretation, economists the latter. It is argued that the mentalistic interpretation is preferable if our aim is to use decision theory for descriptive purposes, but if our aim is normative then the behaviouristic interpretation cannot be dispensed with.