Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Kuhl, Julius[Herausgeber]
• Beckmann, Jürgen[Herausgeber]

Titel

Action Control : From Cognition to Behavior

Ist Teil von

• Springer Series in Social Psychology

Ort / Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Erscheinungsjahr

1985

Link zum Volltext

• Volltext

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• 1. Introduction and Overview -- I. Cognitive and Motivational Determinants of Action -- 2. From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior -- 3. Knowing What to Do: On the Epistemology of Actions -- 4. The Pursuit of Self-Defining Goals -- II. Self-Regulatory Processes and Action Control -- 5. Historical Perspectives in the Study of Action Control -- 6. Volitional Mediators of Cognition-Behavior Consistency; Self Regulatory Processes and Action Versus State Orientation -- 7. Dissonance and Action Control -- 8. Action Control and the Coping Process -- III. Problem-Solving and Performance Control -- 9. Mechanisms of Control and Regulation in Problem Solving -- 10. Thinking and the Organization of Action -- 11. A Control-Systems Approach to the Self-Regulation of Action -- 12. From Cognition to Behavior: Perspectives for Future Research on Action Control -- Author Index
• "It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psychologists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cognition and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancyvalue theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move anything," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities involved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the behavior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the maintenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies