Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Mittelstaedt, Peter

Titel

Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics

Ist Teil von

• Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science : 18

Ort / Verlag

Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands

Erscheinungsjahr

1976

Link zum Volltext

• Volltext

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• I/Space and Time -- 1. Formulation of the Problem -- 2. The Special Theory of Relativity -- 3. The Structure of Physics in the Theory of Relativity -- 4. Space and Time in the Philosophy of Kant -- 5. Critique of the Concept of Time in the Theory of Relativity -- II/Euclidean And Riemannian Geometry -- 1. Formulation of the Problem -- 2. The Foundation of Euclidean Geometry -- 3. The Theory of the Metric Field -- 4. The Foundation of a Physical Geometry -- 5. Summary -- III/The Quantum-Mechanical Measurement Process -- 1. The Uncertainty Relation -- 2. Quantum Theory -- 3. The Measuring Process -- 4. The Cut -- 5. The Function of the Observer in Quantum Theory -- IV/The Concept of Substance -- 1. The Concept of Substance in Classical Physics -- 2. The Concept of Substance in Quantum Theory -- 3. Objectifiability -- 4. Critique of the Concept of Substance in Quantum Theory -- V/The Causal Law -- 1. The Concept of Causality in Philosophy -- 2. The Concept of Causality in Physics -- 3.
• Professor Peter Mittelstaedt is a physicist whose primary concern is the foundations of current physical theories. This concern has made him, through his prolonged, incisive and detailed examinations of the structures and overall characteristics of these theories, into a philosopher of physic- of contemporary physics, to be precise, of relativistic theories of space and time, and of the logic of quantum mechanics, in particular. The present book, which expounds his main ideas in these matters, has seen four editions (in German), each including newer results - as indeed does the present translation: see the author's 1975 preface to the English translation. Perhaps this is the place to repeat the author's chief problem and mention his own approach, even though they are expounded in his Intro℗Ư duction. How close is Mittelstaedt to Kant's understanding of science? We are at liberty to choose a framework for thought - a logic and a method℗Ư ology - prior to experience (in the classic sense, to think a priori); yet we choose a framework so as to fit our empirical findings. How is this done? How may it be understood and justified? This is obviously the question of all philosophies that evolve from, and are in reaction to, Kant's system