Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Rimell, Nicholas,

Titel

Representational content and the objects of thought

Ort / Verlag

Singapore : Palgrave Macmillan,

Erscheinungsjahr

[2021]

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- Reference -- 2 Narrow Representational Content -- 2.1 Narrow Content and Wide Content: The Initial Picture -- 2.2 A Complication -- 2.3 Representational Content -- 2.4 Truth and Representational Content -- 2.5 Jackson on Representational Content -- 2.6 Chalmers on Subjunctive Content and Epistemic Content -- 2.6.1 Subjunctive Content as Wide Content -- 2.6.2 Epistemic Content as Narrow Content -- 2.6.3 Truth Conditions and CFT -- 2.7 Internalism and CFT -- 2.8 Conclusion -- References -- 3 Narrow Content and Propositions -- 3.1 The Traditional Doctrine of Belief -- 3.2 CFT and the Traditional Doctrine of Belief -- 3.3 The Case for Relativized Propositions -- 3.3.1 Different Conceptions of Relativized Propositions -- 3.3.2 Why Believe in Relativized Propositions? -- 3.4 Same Proposition Rules out Relativized Propositions as Sets of Centered Worlds (and as Functions from Centered Worlds to Truth Values) -- 3.5 Same Proposition Rules out Relativized Propositions and, Consequently, Internalism -- 3.5.1 The Argument Against Relativized Propositions -- 3.5.2 Premise (5) -- 3.5.3 Premise (6) -- 3.5.4 Internalism and the Argument Against Relativized Propositions -- 3.6 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Private Propositions -- 4.1 The Fregean Argument for Private Propositions -- 4.2 Objections to the Fregean Argument for Private Propositions -- 4.3 In Defense of Private Propositions -- 4.3.1 Distinguishing Between Private Propositions -- 4.3.2 Private Propositions as Incommunicable -- 4.3.3 Private Propositions as not Worth the Cost -- 4.4 In Defense of Egocentric Externalism -- 4.5 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Why We Cannot Think about Nonexistents -- 5.1 Thinking as Relational and Thinking about Nonexistents -- 5.2 The Magician Argument.
• 5.3 Formally Analyzing the Magician Argument -- 5.4 The Straightforward Analysis -- 5.5 Kriegel's Monadic Adverbialism -- 5.6 Thinking by Proxy -- 5.7 Generalizing about Generalizing -- 5.8 The Magician Argument Arguments -- 5.9 Why We Cannot Think about Nonexistents -- 5.10 What We're Thinking about When We Think We're Thinking about Nonexistents -- 5.11 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Against Necessary Existence -- 6.1 The Argument from Propositions -- 6.2 Necessitism, Necessitarianism, and Events -- 6.3 Implications from the Varieties of Views on Propositions -- 6.3.1 Propositions as Sets of Possible Worlds -- 6.3.2 Propositions as Structured -- 6.3.3 Propositions as Action Types -- 6.3.4 Propositions as Simple -- 6.4 The Argument from Propositions Is, at Best, Unmotivated -- 6.5 The Argument from Propositions Is Unsound -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Conclusion -- Appendix A: Two Revised Arguments for CFT -- Appendix B: Another Argument from Propositions -- Name Index -- Subject Index.
• Description based on print version record.