Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Bieri, Peter,
• Horstmann, Rolf-Peter,
• Krüger, Lorenz,

Titel

Transcendental arguments and science : essays in epistemology

Auflage

1st ed. 1979

Ort / Verlag

Dordrecht, Netherlands : D. Reidel Publishing Company,

Erscheinungsjahr

[1979]

Link zum Volltext

• SpringerLink Books - AutoHoldings

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Includes indexes.
• Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
• I. The Structure and Function of Transcendental Arguments -- Transcendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason -- Transcendental Arguments, Synthetic and Analytic. Comment on Baum -- A Note on Transcendental Propositions in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Comment on Baum -- Analytic Transcendental Arguments -- On Bennett’s ‘Analytic Transcendental Arguments’ -- Comment on Bennett -- Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism -- Comment on Rorty -- Challenger or Competitor? On Rorty’s Account of Transcendental Strategies -- II. The Conceptual Foundations of Science -- The Preconditions of Experience and the Unity of Physics -- Comment on von Weiszäcker -- Comment on von Weizsäcker -- The Concept of Science. Some Remarks on the Methodological Issue ‘Construction’ versus ‘Description’ in the Philosophy of Science -- Transcendentalism and Protoscience. Comment on Lorenz -- Sellarsian Realism and Conceptual Change in Science -- Some Remarks on Realism and Scientific Revolutions. Comment on Burian -- Realism and Underdetermination. Comment on Burian -- III. The Transcendental Approach and Alternative Positions -- Transcendental Arguments and Pragmatic Epistemology -- Conceptual Schemes, Justification and Consistency. Comment on Rosenberg -- Comment on Rosenberg -- The Significance of Scepticism -- Scepticism and How to Take It. Comment on Stroud -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.
• The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifically, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justification of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The resulting program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with conceptual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously.
• Description based on print version record.