Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Seargent, David A. J

Titel

Plurality and Continuity : An Essay in G.F. Stout�́�s Theory of Universals

Ist Teil von

• Nijhoff International Philosophy Series : 21

Ort / Verlag

Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands

Erscheinungsjahr

1985

Link zum Volltext

• Volltext

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• 1. Some Relevant Pre-Stoutian Theories -- 1. Early Greek Philosophers -- 2. Medieval and Later Philosophers -- 3. Stout�́�s Older Contemporaries -- 2. Stout�́�s Theory of Universals (1): Some Key Terms -- 1. General Statement of Stout�́�s Position -- 2. Distributive Unity -- 3. Resemblance -- 4. Classes and Kinds in Stout�́�s Philosophy -- 5. Possiblities in Stout�́�s Philosophy -- 3. Stout�́�s Theory of Universals (2): Stout�́�s Abstract Particularism -- 1. Stoutian Particulars as Predicates -- 2. General Criticisms of Stout�́�s Abstract Particularism -- 4. A Suggested Approach to the Problem of Universals -- 1. Jerrold Levinson�́�s Theory of Attributes -- General Index
• by D. M. Armstrong In the history of the discussion of the problem of universals, G. F. Stout has an honoured, and special. place. For the Nominalist, meaning by that term a philosopher who holds that existence of repeatables - kinds, sorts, type- and the indubitable existence of general terms, is a problem. The Nominalist's opponent, the Realist, escapes the Nominalist's difficulty by postulating universals. He then faces difficulties of his own. Is he to place these universals in a special realm? Or is he to bring them down to earth: perhaps turning them into repeatable properties of particulars (universalia in res), and repeatable relations between universals (universalia inter res)? Whichever solution he opts for, there are well-known difficulties about how particulars stand to these universals. Under these circumstances the Nominalist may make an important con℗Ư cession to the Realist, a concession which he can make without abandoning his Nominalism. He may concede that metaphysics ought to recognize that particulars have properties (qualities, perhaps) and are related by relations. But, he can maintain, these properties and relations are particulars, not universals. Nor, indeed, is such a position entirely closed to the Realist. A Realist about universals may, and some Realists do, accept particularized properties and relations in addition to universals. As Dr. Seargent shows at the beginning of his book. a doctrine of part℗Ư icularized properties and relations has led at least a submerged existence from Plato onwards. The special, classical