UB Paderborn / Katalog / Suche / in CDI

Sortiert nach

Einfacher Volltextzugriff von (fast) überall

Installieren Sie die LibKey Nomad-Browsererweiterung und erhalten Sie von vielen Webseiten einfachen Zugriff auf lizenzierte Volltexte oder Open Access Publikationen. Mehr erfahren...

Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility

International journal of game theory, 2023-12, Vol.52 (4), p.993-1007

Korpela, Ville

2023

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information

Journal of mathematical economics, 2018-08, Vol.77, p.25-31

Korpela, Ville

2018

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation

Games and economic behavior, 2020-05, Vol.121, p.108-116

2020

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying

Journal of institutional and theoretical economics, 2017-06, Vol.173 (2), p.376-393

Korpela, Ville

2017

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation

Journal of economic theory, 2013-09, Vol.148 (5), p.2183-2193

Korpela, Ville

2013

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals

Social choice and welfare, 2014-10, Vol.43 (3), p.647-658

Korpela, Ville

2014

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures

Games and economic behavior, 2021-07, Vol.128, p.202-212

2021

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Journal of economic theory, 2020-01, Vol.185, p.104953, Article 104953

2020

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities

Games and economic behavior, 2024-01, Vol.143, p.77-102

2024

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Behavioral strong implementation

Economic theory, 2023-11, Vol.76 (4), p.1257-1287

2023

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Implementation without rationality assumptions

Theory and decision, 2012-02, Vol.72 (2), p.189-203

Korpela, Ville

2012

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Nash implementation theory — A note on full characterizations

Economics letters, 2010-09, Vol.108 (3), p.283-285

Korpela, Ville

2010

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Yet Another Very Short Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

SSRN Electronic Journal

Korpela, Ville Pentti

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Corrigendum to: A Simple Sufficient Condition for Strong Implementation

SSRN Electronic Journal

Korpela, Ville Pentti

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry

SSRN Electronic Journal

Korpela, Ville Pentti

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

All Deceptions are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying

SSRN Electronic Journal

Korpela, Ville Pentti

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Behavioral Implementation Without Unanimity

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2024

2024

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation

SSRN Electronic Journal

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

The Difference between the Weak Core and the Strong Core from the Design Point of View

SSRN Electronic Journal

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Implementation in vNM Stable Set

SSRN Electronic Journal

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Iterative Monotonicity is equivalent to strict group monotonicity: A direct proof

SSRN Electronic Journal

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

SSRN Electronic Journal

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation

SSRN Electronic Journal

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Probiotic Leuconostoc mesenteroides ssp. cremoris and Streptococcus thermophilus induce IL-12 and IFN-γ production

World journal of gastroenterology : WJG, 2008-02, Vol.14 (8), p.1192-1203

2008

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

SSRN Electronic Journal

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

1 – 25 von 103

Menü

Weitere Dienste

Einstellungen

Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information

Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation

All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with a Social Norm against Lying

A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation

Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals

Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures

Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities

Behavioral strong implementation

Implementation without rationality assumptions

Nash implementation theory — A note on full characterizations

Yet Another Very Short Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

Corrigendum to: A Simple Sufficient Condition for Strong Implementation

Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry

All Deceptions are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying

Behavioral Implementation Without Unanimity

Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation

The Difference between the Weak Core and the Strong Core from the Design Point of View

Implementation in vNM Stable Set

Iterative Monotonicity is equivalent to strict group monotonicity: A direct proof

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation

Probiotic Leuconostoc mesenteroides ssp. cremoris and Streptococcus thermophilus induce IL-12 and IFN-γ production

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

Suchergebnisse filtern