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Borda count in a forward agenda

Public choice, 2024-04, Vol.199 (1-2), p.27-44

2024

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TRENDS: Creating Parties in Congress: The Emergence of a Social Network

Political research quarterly, 2020-12, Vol.73 (4), p.759-773

Dougherty, Keith L.

2020

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Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment

Public choice, 2022-07, Vol.192 (1-2), p.115-126

2022

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Coalitional Instability and the Three-Fifths Compromise

American journal of political science, 2018-10, Vol.62 (4), p.861-872

2018

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The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox

Theory and decision, 2022-10, Vol.93 (3), p.427-447

2022

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The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design

1. Aufl., 2011

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The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787

American politics research, 2024-03, Vol.52 (2), p.170-181

2024

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Stopping rules for majority voting: A public choice experiment

Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2020-07, Vol.175, p.353-364

2020

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The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions

European Journal of Political Economy, 2020-12, Vol.65, p.101936, Article 101936

2020

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An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules

Constitutional political economy, 2016-09, Vol.27 (3), p.332-353

2016

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The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups

Public choice, 2015-04, Vol.163 (1/2), p.31-52

2015

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Buchanan and Tullock's apple

Public choice, 2012-09, Vol.152 (3/4), p.403-406

Dougherty, Keith L.

2012

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Memories Of Mancur: A Student Reminisces

Decyzje, 2015-12 (24), p.19-21

Dougherty, Keith L

2015

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The Consistency of James Madison’s Politics

American political thought (Chicago, Ill.), 2017-03, Vol.6 (2), p.201-227

2017

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Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis

Public choice, 2012-06, Vol.151 (3/4), p.655-678

2012

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A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention

The Journal of economic history, 2013-06, Vol.73 (2), p.407-444

2013

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Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress

American politics research, 2014-07, Vol.42 (4), p.600-627

2014

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The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important

Journal of theoretical politics, 2010-01, Vol.22 (1), p.85-122

2010

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Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule

The Journal of politics, 2009-04, Vol.71 (2), p.733-747

2009

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Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes

Public finance review, 2010-11, Vol.38 (6), p.738-761

2010

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Voting on Slavery at the Constitutional Convention

Public choice, 2008-09, Vol.136 (3/4), p.293-313, Article 293

2008

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An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited

The Journal of economic history, 2007-12, Vol.67 (4), p.829-848

2007

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A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention

The American political science review, 2006-05, Vol.100 (2), p.297-302

2006

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When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality

Mathematical social sciences, 2023-05, Vol.123, p.128-136

2023

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An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783

Social science history, 2009, Vol.33 (1), p.47-74

Dougherty, Keith L.

2009

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Borda count in a forward agenda

TRENDS: Creating Parties in Congress: The Emergence of a Social Network

Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment

Coalitional Instability and the Three-Fifths Compromise

The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox

The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design

The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787

Stopping rules for majority voting: A public choice experiment

The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions

An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules

The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups

Buchanan and Tullock's apple

Memories Of Mancur: A Student Reminisces

The Consistency of James Madison’s Politics

Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis

A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention

Partisan Agenda Control and the Dimensionality of Congress

The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important

Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule

Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes

Voting on Slavery at the Constitutional Convention

An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited

A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention

When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality

An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783

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