UB Paderborn / Katalog / Suche / in CDI

What is the “Equal Weight View”?

Episteme, 2009-10, Vol.6 (3), p.280-293

2009

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism

Philosophy and phenomenological research, 2011-11, Vol.83 (3), p.666-672

FITELSON, BRANDEN

2011

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

A DECISION PROCEDURE FOR PROBABILITY CALCULUS WITH APPLICATIONS

The review of symbolic logic, 2008-06, Vol.1 (1), p.111-125

FITELSON, BRANDEN

2008

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

THE WASON TASK(S) AND THE PARADOX OF CONFIRMATION

Philosophical perspectives, 2010-12, Vol.24 (1), p.207-241

2010

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

FEW 2009 Special Issue: Preface

Journal of philosophical logic, 2010-12, Vol.39 (6), p.591-591

Fitelson, Branden

2010

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

The philosophical significance of Stein’s paradox

European journal for philosophy of science, 2017-10, Vol.7 (3), p.411-433

2017

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Remarks on "Random Sequences"

The Australasian journal of logic, 2015-01, Vol.12 (1)

2015

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy

Thinking & reasoning, 2008-05, Vol.14 (2), p.182-199

2008

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Special Issue on FEW 2011

Journal of philosophical logic, 2012, Vol.41 (6)

FITELSON, Branden

2012

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Updating: Learning versus supposing

Cognition, 2012-09, Vol.124 (3), p.373-378

2012

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications

Philosophy of science, 2001-09, Vol.68 (3), p.S123-S140

Fitelson, Branden

2001

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

The Paradox of Confirmation

Philosophy compass, 2006-01, Vol.1 (1), p.95-113

Fitelson, Branden

2006

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation: Bayesian epistemology

Synthese (Dordrecht), 2007, Vol.156 (3), p.473-489

FITELSON, Branden

2007

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Introduction

Studia logica, 2007-10, Vol.86 (3), p.351-352

Fitelson, Branden

2007

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Introduction

Studia logica, 2007-07, Vol.86 (2), p.147-148

Fitelson, Branden

2007

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support

Philosophical studies, 2002-01, Vol.107 (2), p.129-142

2002

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

The British journal for the philosophy of science, 2007-06, Vol.58 (2), p.333-338

2007

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction

Philosophy of science, 2002-12, Vol.69 (4), p.611-622

Fitelson, Branden

2002

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Introduction to the Special Issue: Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies

Synthese (Dordrecht), 2012-01, Vol.184 (1), p.1-1

2012

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Note of the Editors

Erkenntnis, 2014-06, Vol.79 (Suppl 6), p.1089-1089

2014

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

David Howie, Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2002), xi + 262 pp., $60.00 cloth

Philosophy of science, 2003-07, Vol.70 (3), p.643-646

Fitelson, Branden

2003

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

The Paradox of Confirmation 1

Philosophy compass, 2006-01, Vol.1 (1), p.95-113

Fitelson, Branden

2006

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

The Paradox of Confirmation1

Philosophy compass, 2006-01, Vol.1 (1), p.95-113

Fitelson, Branden

2006

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Bayesians sometimes cannot ignore even very implausible theories (even ones that have not yet been thought of)

The Australasian journal of logic, 2008-08, Vol.6

2008

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Ian Hacking. An introduction to probability and inductive logic. Cambridge University Press, 2000, xvii + 302 pp

The bulletin of symbolic logic, 2003-12, Vol.9 (4), p.506-508

Fitelson, Branden

2003

Volltextzugriff (PDF)

Menü

Weitere Dienste

Einstellungen

What is the “Equal Weight View”?

Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism

A DECISION PROCEDURE FOR PROBABILITY CALCULUS WITH APPLICATIONS

THE WASON TASK(S) AND THE PARADOX OF CONFIRMATION

FEW 2009 Special Issue: Preface

The philosophical significance of Stein’s paradox

Remarks on "Random Sequences"

Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy

Special Issue on FEW 2011

Updating: Learning versus supposing

A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications

The Paradox of Confirmation

Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation: Bayesian epistemology

Introduction

Introduction

Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support

Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction

Introduction to the Special Issue: Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies

Note of the Editors

David Howie, Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2002), xi + 262 pp., $60.00 cloth

The Paradox of Confirmation 1

The Paradox of Confirmation1

Bayesians sometimes cannot ignore even very implausible theories (even ones that have not yet been thought of)

Ian Hacking. An introduction to probability and inductive logic. Cambridge University Press, 2000, xvii + 302 pp

Suchergebnisse filtern