Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Evers, K.
• Farisco, M.
• Pennartz, C.M.A.

Titel

Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses

Ist Teil von

• Consciousness and cognition, 2024-03, Vol.119, p.103668-103668, Article 103668

Ort / Verlag

United States: Elsevier Inc

Erscheinungsjahr

2024

Quelle

MEDLINE

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• •The diversity among current theories of consciousness raises the question whether convergence towards a more unified framework is achievable;•To advance towards a more unified framework we pose the question whether the theories are commensurable, i.e. whether the theories can be compared along particular dimensions;•Both logical and if possible empirical commensurability are necessary conditions for identifying minimal logical and possibly empirical common denominators among different theories of consciousness;•We introduce dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness with the final aim to elaborate a methodology for comparing, integrating, and differentiating different theories of consciousness;•Our methodology consists in considering how the various theories answer to a common list of ‘probing questions’ aiming to pin down theories on basic assumptions and core predictions;•After having identified points of (dis)similarity amongst otherwise commensurable theories, the methodology proceeds to identify predictions where theories critically differ in terms of experimental outcomes or model performances;•We conclude that it is unlikely that one common denominator, subserving theoretical unification, can be identified, if only because of the vast differences in background definitions. Given these differences, however, efforts towards integration and merging of theories can be made. How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.