Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Wikforss, Åsa

Titel

Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity

Ist Teil von

• Inquiry (Oslo), 2018-10, Vol.61 (7), p.755-766

Ort / Verlag

Oslo: Routledge

Erscheinungsjahr

2018

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Taylor & Francis

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard's preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving 'oughts'. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis - a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.