Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Heppell, T.

Titel

Ministerial selection and portfolio allocation in the Cameron government

Ist Teil von

• Parliamentary affairs, 2014-01, Vol.67 (1), p.64-79

Ort / Verlag

Oxford: Oxford Publishing Limited (England)

Erscheinungsjahr

2014

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• This paper examines how David Cameron has utilised the Prime Ministerial power of ministerial selection and portfolio allocation within the context of the relationship between party expectations and coalition constraints. Specifically, the paper considers the significance to the Parliamentary Conservative Party of Cameron's use of patronage in terms of proportionality (numbers); portfolio distribution (prestige) and reshuffles (renegotiation of numbers and prestige). It argues that Cameron has been relatively astute in terms of his allocation of portfolios to the Liberal Democrats. However, it notes that the constraining impact of coalition has been detrimental to three groups within the PCP: first, those made ministers at a lower level than expected; secondly, those who held shadow ministerial posts in opposition but were overlooked when fewer ministerial roles were available; and, finally, the new intake of 2010 whose career progression has been slower than in previous administrations as fewer reshuffles have occurred.