Finanzarchiv, 2011-09, Vol.67 (3), p.261-281
2011
Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- Rank-Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion, and Labor Supply
- Ist Teil von
- Finanzarchiv, 2011-09, Vol.67 (3), p.261-281
- Ort / Verlag
- Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2011
- Link zum Volltext
- Quelle
- Alma/SFX Local Collection
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- In a portfolio model of tax evasion an expected utility maximizer will cheat more than what is estimated in empirical studies. At least two types of explanation have been suggested as solutions to this puzzle: (1) taxpayers act according to some unexpected utility theory, and (2) individual ethical norms and social stigma induce people not to cheat. Based on Norwegian survey data, we find that a rank-dependent expected-utility model performs better than an expected-utility model and that social norms matter in explaining behavior.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0015-2218eISSN: 1614-0974DOI: 10.1628/001522111X600597Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_917296771
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Economic behaviour, Economic modeling, Economic models, Economic recessions, Estimated taxes, Expected utility, Income taxes, Labor economics, Labor supply, Modeling, Norway, Portfolio management, Public finance, rank-dependent utility, Social norms, Social sciences, Studies, Tax evasion, Utility functions, Utility theory