The American economic review, 2011-10, Vol.101 (6), p.2425-2449
2011
Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices
- Ist Teil von
- The American economic review, 2011-10, Vol.101 (6), p.2425-2449
- Ort / Verlag
- Nashville: American Economic Association
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2011
- Link zum Volltext
- Quelle
- EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0002-8282eISSN: 1944-7981DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2425Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_906329650
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Acids, Agreements, Antitrust, Cartels, Chloride, Collusion, Communication, Economic theory, Equilibrium, Information, Market demand, Market prices, Market share, Market shares, Nash equilibrium, Price wars, Prices, Quotas, Sales quotas, Sales reporting, Studies