Review of industrial organization, 2011-08, Vol.39 (1/2), p.39-56
2011
Volltextzugriff (PDF)
Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
- Ist Teil von
- Review of industrial organization, 2011-08, Vol.39 (1/2), p.39-56
- Ort / Verlag
- Boston: Springer
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2011
- Quelle
- PAIS Index
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- Recent research has highlighted the quantitative contribution to merger analysis from extending unilateral effects models to understand the payoffs to future potential coordinated effects. Some of the emphasis of this research appears to have made its way into the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this paper, we demonstrate the quantification of coordinated effects in an oligopoly and procurement model, and we show that screens that are based on upward pricing pressure are not adequate in mergers where coordinated effects are a potential concern.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0889-938XeISSN: 1573-7160DOI: 10.1007/s11151-011-9303-yTitel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_880336754
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Acquisitions & mergers, Antitrust, Antitrust laws, Cartels, Collusion, Cost allocation, Cost efficiency, Divestiture, Economic concentration, Economics, Economics and Finance, Fringe, Horizontal integration, Incentives, Industrial Organization, Marginal costs, Market share, Mergers, Microeconomics, Modelling, Oligopolies, Oligopoly, Payoffs, Pricing, Procurement, Profits, Purchasing, Regulation, Studies