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Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model
Ist Teil von
The American economic review, 2011-04, Vol.101 (2), p.819-843
Ort / Verlag
Nashville: American Economic Association
Erscheinungsjahr
2011
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
Beschreibungen/Notizen
This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relationship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multiperiod environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages.