Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Chaudhuri, Ananish

Titel

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

Ist Teil von

• Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association, 2011-03, Vol.14 (1), p.47-83

Ort / Verlag

Boston: Boston : Springer US

Erscheinungsjahr

2011

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.