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[...]all pure use theories that suggest accounting for meaning in terms of what the speaker does (and is disposed to do), rather than in terms of what she should do, are to be dismissed. Since there are many versions of pure use-theories (causal-informational theories, conceptual role theories, Davidsonian use-theories,2 etc.), it seems as if Kripkes normativity thesis, if correct, could be used to wipe out a good part of contemporary philosophy of language.3It therefore is hardly surprising that Kripkes thesis has received so much attention. [...]if what underlies the idea that meaning is normative is the controversial claim that we reject the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, then it cannot be said that the commitment to normativity is a pre-theoretical constraint, independent of any particular theory of meaning. According to this picture, there is a constitutive relation between use and meaning such that in order to mean horse by horse you must use (be disposed to use) your words in certain ways. [...]on such a view, S could mean horse by horse and yet use horse in any way she likes.49 By making the link between meaning and use constitutive, this kind of scenario is avoided.3.