Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Moene, Karl Ove
• Wallerstein, Michael

Titel

Collective Bargaining Versus Workers′ Ownership

Ist Teil von

• Journal of Comparative Economics, 1993-09, Vol.17 (3), p.628-645

Ort / Verlag

New York: Elsevier Inc

Erscheinungsjahr

1993

Quelle

Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect (DFG Nationallizenzen)

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• This paper compares the performance of worker-owned firms with the outcome of industry-level collective bargaining. We study the impact of workers′ ownership and wage bargaining on price and output, employment, firm size, and workers′ income in an industry with heterogeneous firms and free entry. Workers may receive income above the competitive wage for two reasons. There are firm-specific rents due to differences in productivity among plants and there may be industry-wide rents due to price increases that follow from increases in the industry wage. While workers′ ownership allows workers to obtain all firm-specific rents, industry-wide rents are eliminated through the entry of new firms without a union. J. Comp. Econom., March 1993, 17(3) , pp. 628-645. University of Oslo, 0317 Oslo 3, Norway; and University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90024.