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Vote-Seeking Incentive and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies
Ist Teil von
The Journal of politics, 2004-08, Vol.66 (3), p.823-846
Erscheinungsjahr
2004
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
Beschreibungen/Notizen
Through the use of an original data set of bill initiation activity in six presidential democracies, we advance scholarly understanding of how the institutional incentives faced by legislative candidates influence representation. We extend & adapt theory, derived primarily from the experience of the US Congress, demonstrating its viability, once assumed constants from the US case are explicitly modeled, in quite distinct institutional contexts. In particular, we find the focus of individual legislators on national vs parochial concerns responds to the incentives provided by the candidate selection process, general election rules, legislator career patterns, & interbranch relations. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 46 References. Adapted from the source document.