International organization, 2003-04, Vol.57 (2), p.307-336
2003
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Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation
- Ist Teil von
- International organization, 2003-04, Vol.57 (2), p.307-336
- Ort / Verlag
- New York, USA: Cambridge University Press
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2003
- Quelle
- PAIS Index
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- This article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics. Based on evidence from twenty-two industrialized countries, we argue that electoral rules—specifically, the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal—have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system. Moreover, despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration, the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0020-8183eISSN: 1531-5088DOI: 10.1017/S0020818303572034Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60697728
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Bank failures, Bank loans, Bank regulation, Banking, Banking industry, Banking law, Banking regulation, Banking system, Banks, Campaign contributions, Cartels, Commercial regulation, Consumers, Convergence, Domestic politics, Economic models, Elections, Electoral rules, Electoral Systems, Financial policy, Globalization, Government Regulation, Gross national product, Industrialized nations, International finance, International relations, Nation state, Political elections, Political finance, Political parties, Political regulation, Politicians, Politics, Regulation, Regulation of financial institutions, Retail banking, Small business, Systems stability