Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Acemoglu, Daron
• Robinson, James A.

Titel

Inefficient Redistribution

Ist Teil von

• The American political science review, 2001-09, Vol.95 (3), p.649-661

Ort / Verlag

New York, USA: Cambridge University Press

Erscheinungsjahr

2001

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• There are many well-developed theories that explain why governments redistribute income, but very few can explain why this often is done in a socially inefficient form. In the theory we develop, compared to efficient methods, inefficient redistribution makes it more attractive to stay in or enter a group that receives subsidies. When political institutions cannot credibly commit to future policy, and when the political influence of a group depends on its size, inefficient redistribution is a tool to sustain political power. Our model may account for the choice of inefficient redistributive policies in agriculture, trade, and the labor market. It also implies that when factors of production are less specific to a sector, inefficient redistribution may be more prevalent.