Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Leach, J. Chris

Titel

Repetition, Reputation, and Raiding

Ist Teil von

• The Review of financial studies, 1992-01, Vol.5 (4), p.685-708

Ort / Verlag

New York, NY: Oxford University Press

Erscheinungsjahr

1992

Quelle

Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• I develop a multitarget takeover model with bid revisions, in which bidders desire a reputation for having low valuations. Such a reputation increases the likelihood that future targets will accept low premium bids. Bidders develop reputation by using low take-it-or-leave-it offers. Consequently, tender premiums, bid revision rates, and success rates are lower for continuing bidders than for those considering only a single target. Success rates vary within a series, and reputation building is more likely with highly correlated target valuations. I provide an exploratory empirical analysis consistent with lower premiums from continuing bidders and discuss some resulting implications regarding "raiders," conglomerates, and resistance strategies.