International economic review (Philadelphia), 2005-02, Vol.46 (1), p.145-169
2005
Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY
- Ist Teil von
- International economic review (Philadelphia), 2005-02, Vol.46 (1), p.145-169
- Ort / Verlag
- 350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2DQ , UK: Blackwell Publishing, Inc
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2005
- Link zum Volltext
- Quelle
- EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- The dynamic behavior of a price-fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Consistent with preceding static theories, the cartel's steady-state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection. However, contrary to those theories, it is independent of the level of fixed fines. It is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0020-6598eISSN: 1468-2354DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00313.xTitel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38092119
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Anti-trust legislation, Antitrust, Antitrust policy, Cartels, Collusion, Economic behaviour, Economic theory, Monopoly, Price changes, Price fixing, Price levels, Pricing, Probability, Static modeling, Studies, Tax evasion