Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Armantier, Olivier
• Florens, Jean-Pierre
• Richard, Jean-Francois

Titel

Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games

Ist Teil von

• Journal of applied econometrics (Chichester, England), 2008-11, Vol.23 (7), p.965-981

Ort / Verlag

Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Erscheinungsjahr

2008

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian games, including games without analytically tractable solutions. Finally, we illustrate the flexibility of the CSE approximation with a series of auction examples, including a complex multi-unit auction.