Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria), 2008-07, Vol.94 (2), p.105-124
2008
Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument
- Ist Teil von
- Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria), 2008-07, Vol.94 (2), p.105-124
- Ort / Verlag
- Vienna: Springer-Verlag
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2008
- Link zum Volltext
- Quelle
- EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- Government-run entities are often more labor-intensive than private companies, even with identical production technologies. This need not imply slack in the public sector, but may reflect a wage tax advantage, stemming from the fact that government entities (partly) pay their taxes to themselves. A tax-induced cost advantage of public production precludes production efficiency and reduces welfare when labor supply is inelastic. With an elastic labor supply, a wage tax advantage of the public sector may improve welfare if it allows for a higher net wage.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0931-8658eISSN: 1617-7134DOI: 10.1007/s00712-008-0002-6Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36968904
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Budgets, Commercial production, Decision making, Economic theory, Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods, Economics, Economics and Finance, Employees, Employment, Equilibrium models, Game Theory, Government, Government budgets, Income taxes, Labor costs, Labor supply, Labour intensity, Labour productivity, Labour supply, Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics, Microeconomics, Mixed economies, Optimal taxation, Prices, Private sector, Privatization, Production efficiency, Public economics, Public Finance, Public sector, Public services, Social and Behav. Sciences, Social security taxes, Studies, Tax advantages, Tax revenues, Taxation