Sie befinden Sich nicht im Netzwerk der Universität Paderborn. Der Zugriff auf elektronische Ressourcen ist gegebenenfalls nur via VPN oder Shibboleth (DFN-AAI) möglich. mehr Informationen...
Differential Payments Within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value
Ist Teil von
The American economic review, 1990-06, Vol.80 (3), p.493-510
Ort / Verlag
Menasha, Wis: American Economic Association
Erscheinungsjahr
1990
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
Beschreibungen/Notizen
Bidder coalitions at English auctions frequently distribute collusive gains among members via a secondary auction or "knockout." When coalition members are sufficiently heterogeneous, nested coalition structures are observed in which a knockout is conducted at each level of nesting. The nested knockout's characteristics are investigated. Within many settings we find that the expected payments to coalition members via the nested knockout equal the Shapley value. Incentive compatibility problems of the nested knockout are also analyzed.