Sie befinden Sich nicht im Netzwerk der Universität Paderborn. Der Zugriff auf elektronische Ressourcen ist gegebenenfalls nur via VPN oder Shibboleth (DFN-AAI) möglich. mehr Informationen...
The AI magazine, 2002-09, Vol.23 (3), p.89-100
2002

Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte
Titel
Leveled‐Commitment Contracting: A Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems
Ist Teil von
  • The AI magazine, 2002-09, Vol.23 (3), p.89-100
Ort / Verlag
La Canada: American Association for Artificial Intelligence
Erscheinungsjahr
2002
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
EZB Free E-Journals
Beschreibungen/Notizen
  • In (automated) negotiation systems for self‐interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. They do not accommodate future events. Contingency contracts address this but are often impractical. As an alternative, we propose leveled‐commitment contracts. The level of commitment is set by decommitting penalties. To be freed from the contract, an agent simply pays its penalty to the other contract party(ies). A self‐interested agent will be ruluctant to decommit because some other contract party might decommit, in which case the former agent gets freed from the contract, does not incur a penalty, and collects a penalty from the other party. We show that despite such strategic decommitting, leveled commitment increases the expected payoffs of all contract parties and can enable deals that are impossible under full commitment. Different decommitting mechanisms are introduced and compared. Practical prescriptions for market designers are presented. A contract optimizer, eCommitter, is provided on the web.
Sprache
Englisch
Identifikatoren
ISSN: 0738-4602
eISSN: 2371-9621
DOI: 10.1609/aimag.v23i3.1659
Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_27178783

Weiterführende Literatur

Empfehlungen zum selben Thema automatisch vorgeschlagen von bX