Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Ferrell, Allen
• Liang, Hao
• Renneboog, Luc

Titel

Socially responsible firms

Ist Teil von

• Journal of financial economics, 2016-12, Vol.122 (3), p.585-606

Ort / Verlag

Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V

Erscheinungsjahr

2016

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.