Social choice and welfare, 2016-08, Vol.47 (2), p.277-294
2016
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Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- Ist Teil von
- Social choice and welfare, 2016-08, Vol.47 (2), p.277-294
- Ort / Verlag
- Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2016
- Quelle
- EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- Strategy-proofness has been one of the central axioms in the theory of social choice. However, strategy-proofness often leads to impossibility results. We find that strategy-proofness is decomposed into three axioms: top-restricted AM-proofness, weak monotonicity, and individual bounded response. We present possibility results by dropping individual bounded response from strategy-proofness. One of the results supports the plurality rule which is one of the most widely used rules in practice.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0176-1714eISSN: 1432-217XDOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0959-yTitel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1878788226
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Axioms, Decomposition, Dictators, Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods, Economics, Economics and Finance, Even numbers, Game Theory, Integers, International Political Economy, Logical theorems, Mathematical monotonicity, Misrepresentation, Original Paper, Preferences, Public Finance, Rules, Social and Behav. Sciences, Social choice, Social Policy, Social sciences, Society, Studies, Theory