Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Barrenechea-méndez, Marco a.
• Ortín-Ángel, Pedro
• Rodes, Eduardo C.

Titel

Autonomy and Monitoring

Ist Teil von

• Journal of economics & management strategy, 2016-12, Vol.25 (4), p.911-935

Ort / Verlag

Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Erscheinungsjahr

2016

Quelle

Wiley-Blackwell Journals

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under‐explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal‐agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue‐collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.