Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• CARD, DAVID
• DEVICIENTI, FRANCESCO
• MAIDA, AGATA

Titel

Rent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel Data

Ist Teil von

• The Review of economic studies, 2014-01, Vol.81 (1 (286)), p.84-111

Ort / Verlag

Oxford: Oxford University Press

Erscheinungsjahr

2014

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Rent-sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk capital are captured in higher wages. We propose a simple measure of this "holdup" effect based on the size of the wage offset for firm-specific capital accumulation. Using Social Security earnings records for workers in the Veneto region of Italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers, we find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents per worker of around 4%, arising mainly at larger firms with higher price-cost margins. On the other hand, we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return on investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital.