Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Georganas, Sotiris
• Healy, Paul J.
• Weber, Roberto A.

Titel

On the persistence of strategic sophistication

Ist Teil von

• Journal of economic theory, 2015-09, Vol.159, p.369-400

Ort / Verlag

New York: Elsevier Inc

Erscheinungsjahr

2015

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• We examine whether the “Level-k” model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions at the individual level. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of games does not predict their ranking in the other. Direct tests of strategic reasoning generally do not predict estimated levels. Within families of games, we find that levels are fairly consistent within one family, but not the other. Our results suggest that the use of Level-k reasoning varies by game, making prediction difficult.