Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• WAGENER, ANDREAS

Titel

TAX COMPETITION, RELATIVE PERFORMANCE, AND POLICY IMITATION

Ist Teil von

• International economic review (Philadelphia), 2013-11, Vol.54 (4), p.1251-1264

Ort / Verlag

Philadelphia: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Erscheinungsjahr

2013

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Rather than about their absolute payoffs, governments in fiscal competition often seem to care about their performance relative to other governments. Moreover, they often appear to mimic policies observed elsewhere. I study such behavior in a standard tax competition game. Both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative policies, evolutionary stability for games with finitely many players is the appropriate solution concept. Independently of the number of jurisdictions involved, an evolutionarily stable tax policy coincides with the competitive outcome of a tax competition game with infinitely many players. It, thus, involves drastic efficiency losses.