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The Review of economic studies, 2013-07, Vol.80 (3 (284)), p.845-875
2013

Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte
Titel
Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?
Ist Teil von
  • The Review of economic studies, 2013-07, Vol.80 (3 (284)), p.845-875
Ort / Verlag
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Erscheinungsjahr
2013
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
Oxford Journals 2020 Social Sciences
Beschreibungen/Notizen
  • Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these influences. When they do so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the elite is better organized and is more likely to be able to influence or bribe politicians, and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We also provide case study evidence from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela consistent with the model.
Sprache
Englisch
Identifikatoren
ISSN: 0034-6527
eISSN: 1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdt007
Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1435359412

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