Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Fellner, Gerlinde
• Traxler, Christian
• Sausgruber, Rupert

Titel

TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION

Ist Teil von

• Journal of the European Economic Association, 2013-06, Vol.11 (3), p.634-660

Ort / Verlag

Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell

Erscheinungsjahr

2013

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Oxford Journals 2020 Social Sciences

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common.