Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Chen, Songlin
• Tseng, Mitchell M.

Titel

A Negotiation-Credit-Auction mechanism for procuring customized products

Ist Teil von

• International journal of production economics, 2010-09, Vol.127 (1), p.203-210

Ort / Verlag

Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V

Erscheinungsjahr

2010

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Customization promises higher value creation by matching customers’ individual specific needs with manufacturers’ capabilities. However, difficulties in terms of information asymmetry, information stickiness, and conflicting incentives prevent customers from effectively tapping into the value of customization in procurement. This research conceptualizes procurement of customized products as a transaction problem with an embedded design problem. A Negotiation-Credit-Auction mechanism is developed to separate design and transaction into two stages and employ negotiation and auction, respectively. Bidding credits are introduced in an intermediate stage as an instrument for incentive adjustment. This hybrid mechanism proves to be socially efficient and provides necessary flexibility as well as incentives for innovation in customization.