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Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
Ist Teil von
The Journal of finance (New York), 2002-12, Vol.57 (6), p.2741-2771
Ort / Verlag
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Erscheinungsjahr
2002
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
Wiley Journals Frontfile
Beschreibungen/Notizen
This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.