Southern economic journal, 2012-07, Vol.79 (1), p.161-179
2012
Details
- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods
- Ist Teil von
- Southern economic journal, 2012-07, Vol.79 (1), p.161-179
- Ort / Verlag
- College of Business Administration, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Chattanooga, TN 37403: Southern Economic Association
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2012
- Link zum Volltext
- Quelle
- EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High-powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0038-4038eISSN: 2325-8012DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.161Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1205736237
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Allocative efficiency, Competition, Contests, D74, Economic aspects, Economic models, Economic theory, Efficiency, Forecasts and trends, H41, H70, Incentives, Individuals, K42, Lotteries, Nash equilibrium, Political activity, Political aspects, Politicians, Private goods, Production efficiency, Productive efficiency, Productivity, Public good, Public goods, Quantum efficiency, Studies, Texas, Universities, Universities and colleges