Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Bohmelt, Tobias
• Pilster, Ulrich H

Titel

On Problems of Collective Action: A Quantitative Study of International Environmental Regimes

Ist Teil von

• Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen, 2011-12, Vol.18 (2), p.63-90

Erscheinungsjahr

2011

Quelle

Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Various studies argue that larger groups are less likely to optimally provide a collective good. The following paper builds upon this work as it examines the provision of environmental collective goods through international regimes. Although the regime literature studied problems of collective action and their respective solutions before, we lack the knowledge to explain which situational characteristics actually induce these problems. The following article thus first disaggregates these characteristics along demand-side properties of goods (i.e., public goods, externalities, and common pool resources) and group size, and then analyzes their impact on international environmental regimes' depth of cooperation. The authors find evidence that larger regimes face problems for providing environmental public goods in an optimal way. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that this negative relationship holds true for externalities, but not for common pool resources. Adapted from the source document.