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MFG model with a long-lived penalty at random jump times: application to demand side management for electricity contracts
Ist Teil von
Annals of operations research, 2024-05, Vol.336 (1-2), p.541-569
Ort / Verlag
New York: Springer US
Erscheinungsjahr
2024
Quelle
Alma/SFX Local Collection
Beschreibungen/Notizen
We consider an energy system with
n
consumers who are linked by a Demand Side Management (DSM) contract, i.e. they agreed to diminish, at random times, their aggregated power consumption by a predefined volume during a predefined duration. Their failure to deliver the service is penalised via the difference between the sum of the
n
power consumptions and the contracted target. We are led to analyse a non-zero sum stochastic game with
n
players, where the interaction takes place through a cost which involves a delay induced by the duration included in the DSM contract. When
n
→
∞
, we obtain a Mean-Field Game (MFG) with random jump time penalty and interaction on the control. We prove a stochastic maximum principle in this context, which allows to compare the MFG solution to the optimal strategy of a central planner. In a linear quadratic setting we obtain a semi-explicit solution through a system of decoupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations with jumps, involving a Riccati Backward SDE with jumps. We show that it provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the original
n
-player game for
n
large. Finally, we propose a numerical algorithm to compute the MFG equilibrium and present several numerical experiments.