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Why do presidents make promises while in office and why do they fulfill some of them? We postulate 5 hypotheses to account for the fulfillment of promises made by sitting presidents and test them on an emerging presidential democracy in Latin America. With information on the 951 pledges made by presidents of Chile in annual state of nation addresses (1990-2017), we show that presidents fulfill fewer promises made in their last year, and when they have lower approval, but their seat share support in the legislature does not impact promise fulfillment. Presidents fulfill more promises when the economic conditions are adverse, and in areas where their political parties have issue ownership. Promises from the throne respond to a different logic than campaign promises. Presidents care about the promises they make and seek to fulfill some of them, but they also make unfulfillable promises to please their hardcore base.