Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Zhu, Qingfeng
• Zong, Rui
• Xu, Mengqi

Titel

Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Finance Based on Blockchain Technology

Ist Teil von

• Sustainability, 2023-02, Vol.15 (4), p.3084

Ort / Verlag

Basel: MDPI AG

Erscheinungsjahr

2023

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

EZB Electronic Journals Library

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• In the process of accounts receivable financing under supply chain finance, the phenomenon of accounts receivable forgery and default have caused great pressure on the supervision of financial institutions. We consider the integration of blockchain technology with a supply chain finance platform around the fraudulent default phenomenon in supply chain finance receivables financing and construct a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model among financial institutions, core enterprises, and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Firstly, we use Ito^’s stochastic differential equation theory to analyze the conditions for the stability of the behavior of game subjects. Secondly, we use numerical simulations to quantitatively analyze the impact of the regulatory strength of financial institutions, the information sharing of the blockchain platform, and the change of incentive parameters on the strategy choice of game subjects. Through the above analysis, we conclude that the information-sharing incentive coefficient promotes financial institutions to choose to connect to the blockchain platform, and the information-sharing risk coefficient and the regulatory intensity have the opposite effect on the blockchain platform construction. Meanwhile, the allocation of incentive shares has a significant influence on the core enterprises. Finally, we give priorities and directions for adjusting the relevant parameters to provide recommendations for financial institutions to regulate the financing process more effectively.